---
title: "Section 2255 Cognizability, Default, Actual Innocence, and Ineffective Assistance"
module_id: "MOD-2255-DEFAULT-INNOCENCE-IAC"
url: "https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/modules/60-post-conviction/2255-default-innocence-and-ineffective-assistance/"
current_through: "2026-08-26"
legal_review: "2026-08-25"
links_checked: "2026-10-15"
links_available: 18
links_checked_count: 18
license: "CC BY 4.0"
---

# § 2255 Cognizability, Default, Innocence, and Ineffective Assistance

## Verification boundary

This module supplies nationwide Supreme Court baselines. It does not decide whether a specific claim is constitutional, jurisdictional, defaulted, waived, previously decided, factually innocent, prejudicial, or supported by an adequate record. Relitigation rules, collateral waivers, nonconstitutional sentencing errors, and innocence of enhancements contain important circuit-specific branches.

## Cognizable error

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-023 authorities:AUTH-USC-28-2255 status:verified_current -->
Section 2255 reaches federal constitutional and statutory violations, lack of sentencing jurisdiction, a sentence above the legal maximum, and other grounds satisfying the statute's collateral-attack standard; the label attached to a claim does not establish cognizability. [28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)–(b)](https://www.govinfo.gov/link/uscode/28/2255)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-024 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-HILL-368-US-424 status:verified_current -->
A nonconstitutional violation of a criminal rule is not automatically cognizable: *Hill* required a jurisdictional or constitutional error, a fundamental defect inherently resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice, or an omission inconsistent with rudimentary demands of fair procedure. [*Hill v. United States*, 368 U.S. 424, 428–30 (1962)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-368/pdf/USREPORTS-368-424.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-025 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-DAVIS-417-US-333 status:verified_current -->
*Davis* allowed a federal statutory claim based on an intervening substantive-law change where the conviction and punishment were for conduct the law did not make criminal; the decision does not make every later statutory interpretation collaterally cognizable. [*Davis v. United States*, 417 U.S. 333, 342–47 (1974)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-417/pdf/USREPORTS-417-333.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-026 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-ADDONIZIO-442-US-178 status:verified_current -->
A sentencing judge's disappointed expectation about later executive administration of a lawful sentence was not a § 2255 defect in *Addonizio*; collateral relief requires an error of the fundamental character recognized by the statute and cases, not merely a later outcome different from an unexpressed expectation. [*United States v. Addonizio*, 442 U.S. 178, 184–90 (1979)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-442/pdf/USREPORTS-442-178.pdf)

## Procedural default and innocence gateways

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-027 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-FRADY-456-US-152 status:verified_current -->
Collateral review does not simply import direct-review plain error: for a trial error defaulted by failure to object and appeal, *Frady* required cause and actual prejudice. [*United States v. Frady*, 456 U.S. 152, 164–70 (1982)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-456/pdf/USREPORTS-456-152.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-028 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-FRADY-456-US-152 status:verified_current -->
*Frady*'s actual-prejudice inquiry requires more than a possibility of prejudice and evaluates the error's effect in the complete proceeding; the exact cause rule and claim-specific prejudice standard still require controlling authority and record application. [*Frady*, 456 U.S. at 167–72](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-456/pdf/USREPORTS-456-152.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-029 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-BOUSLEY-523-US-614 status:verified_current -->
A defendant who failed to challenge the constitutional validity of a guilty plea on direct review procedurally defaulted that claim in *Bousley* and had to establish cause and actual prejudice or actual innocence. [*Bousley v. United States*, 523 U.S. 614, 621–24 (1998)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-523/pdf/USREPORTS-523-614.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-030 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-BOUSLEY-523-US-614 status:verified_current -->
The *Bousley* gateway requires factual innocence, not merely legal insufficiency; it opens review of an underlying constitutional claim rather than supplying a freestanding merits claim. [*Bousley*, 523 U.S. at 623–24](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-523/pdf/USREPORTS-523-614.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-031 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-BOUSLEY-523-US-614 status:verified_current -->
When a plea bargain caused the government to forgo more serious charges, *Bousley* permits the government to present any admissible evidence of guilt and requires the movant's innocence showing to extend to those forgone charges. [*Bousley*, 523 U.S. at 624](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-523/pdf/USREPORTS-523-614.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-032 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-SCHLUP-513-US-298 status:verified_current -->
The *Schlup* miscarriage-of-justice gateway requires new reliable evidence and a showing that, considering all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [*Schlup v. Delo*, 513 U.S. 298, 324–32 (1995)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-513/pdf/USREPORTS-513-298.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-033 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-MCQUIGGIN-569-US-383,AUTH-SCOTUS-SCHLUP-513-US-298 status:verified_current -->
*McQuiggin* applied the *Schlup* standard through § 2244(d)'s time bar and held that unexplained delay bears on evidentiary reliability even though diligence is not a separate threshold; the holding arose on the state-habeas track. [*McQuiggin*, 569 U.S. at 386–401](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/boundvolumes/569bv.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-034 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-MCQUIGGIN-569-US-383,AUTH-SCOTUS-BOUSLEY-523-US-614 status:verified_current -->
Neither *McQuiggin* nor *Bousley* establishes a universal gateway for innocence of a Guidelines calculation, sentencing factor, or noncapital enhancement; that proposition must be researched in the controlling circuit and tied to the precise bar asserted. [*McQuiggin*, 569 U.S. at 392–95](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/boundvolumes/569bv.pdf); [*Bousley*, 523 U.S. at 623–24](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-523/pdf/USREPORTS-523-614.pdf)

## Ineffective assistance

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-035 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-MASSARO-538-US-500 status:verified_current -->
An ineffective-assistance claim may be brought first in a § 2255 motion even if the defendant could have raised it on direct appeal; failure to raise it on direct review does not itself procedurally default the claim. [*Massaro v. United States*, 538 U.S. 500, 503–09 (2003)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-538/pdf/USREPORTS-538-500.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-036 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-STRICKLAND-466-US-668 status:verified_current -->
Strickland deficiency asks whether counsel's acts or omissions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and the circumstances as they existed then. [*Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 687–91 (1984)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-466/pdf/USREPORTS-466-668.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-037 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-STRICKLAND-466-US-668 status:verified_current -->
Ordinary Strickland prejudice requires a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance, the result would have been different—a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, not proof by a preponderance that the outcome certainly would have changed. [*Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 693–96](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-466/pdf/USREPORTS-466-668.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-038 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-STRICKLAND-466-US-668 status:verified_current -->
A court may reject an ineffective-assistance claim on either Strickland component without deciding the other. [*Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 697](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-466/pdf/USREPORTS-466-668.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-039 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-STRICKLAND-466-US-668 status:verified_current -->
Judicial review of counsel is highly deferential, avoids hindsight, and presumes reasonable professional assistance, but the presumption does not replace examination of the identified conduct, record, and available alternatives. [*Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 689–91](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-466/pdf/USREPORTS-466-668.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-040 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-CRONIC-466-US-648 status:verified_current -->
*Cronic* presumes prejudice only in narrow circumstances such as complete denial of counsel at a critical stage or an entire failure to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing; poor performance at specific points ordinarily remains a Strickland claim. [*United States v. Cronic*, 466 U.S. 648, 658–67 (1984)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-466/pdf/USREPORTS-466-648.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-041 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-HILL-474-US-52 status:verified_current -->
For deficient advice leading to an accepted guilty plea, *Hill* asks whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on trial. [*Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 56–60 (1985)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-474/pdf/USREPORTS-474-52.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-042 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-LEE-582-US-357 status:verified_current -->
*Lee* requires a case-specific assessment of whether rejecting the plea would have been rational and relies on contemporaneous evidence rather than post hoc assertions; strong evidence of guilt does not categorically foreclose plea prejudice where the consequence driving the decision was deportation. [*Lee v. United States*, 582 U.S. 357, 364–71 (2017)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-582/pdf/USREPORTS-582-357.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-043 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-FRYE-566-US-134 status:verified_current -->
For a favorable plea offer that lapsed because counsel failed to communicate it, *Frye* requires a reasonable probability the defendant would have accepted it, the prosecution would not have withdrawn it, the court would have accepted it, and the result would have been less severe. [*Missouri v. Frye*, 566 U.S. 134, 145–49 (2012)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-566/pdf/USREPORTS-566-134.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-044 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-LAFLER-566-US-156 status:verified_current -->
For deficient advice causing rejection of a plea followed by a less favorable conviction or sentence, *Lafler* requires the specified probabilities concerning acceptance, nonwithdrawal, court acceptance, and a less severe result, followed by a remedy neutralizing the constitutional injury without granting a windfall. [*Lafler v. Cooper*, 566 U.S. 156, 163–75 (2012)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-566/pdf/USREPORTS-566-156.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-045 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-FLORES-ORTEGA-528-US-470 status:verified_current -->
Counsel performs deficiently by disregarding a defendant's express instruction to file an appeal; absent a clear instruction, *Flores-Ortega* applies a circumstance-specific duty to consult and requires prejudice tied to a reasonable probability the defendant would have appealed. [*Roe v. Flores-Ortega*, 528 U.S. 470, 477–86 (2000)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-528/pdf/USREPORTS-528-470.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-046 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-GARZA-586-US-232 status:verified_current -->
When deficient failure to file a requested notice forfeits an appeal, prejudice is presumed even if the defendant signed an appeal waiver because no waiver forecloses every possible appellate claim. [*Garza v. Idaho*, 586 U.S. 232, 242–50 (2019)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-586/pdf/USREPORTS-586-232.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-047 authorities:AUTH-SCOTUS-GLOVER-531-US-198 status:verified_current -->
There is no minimum amount of additional imprisonment required for Strickland prejudice from a sentencing error; any increased prison time has Sixth Amendment significance, although deficiency and causation still must be proven. [*Glover v. United States*, 531 U.S. 198, 202–04 (2001)](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-531/pdf/USREPORTS-531-198.pdf)

<!-- claim:CLM-2255-048 authorities:AUTH-USC-28-2255,AUTH-SCOTUS-GARZA-586-US-232 status:verified_current -->
An express collateral-attack waiver must be analyzed from its actual text, knowing-and-voluntary record, government invocation, claimed exception, requested remedy, and controlling-circuit law; neither § 2255 nor *Garza* supplies a single nationwide list of all enforceable or nonwaivable § 2255 claims. [28 U.S.C. § 2255](https://www.govinfo.gov/link/uscode/28/2255); [*Garza*, 586 U.S. at 238–50](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-586/pdf/USREPORTS-586-232.pdf)

## Claim-analysis checklist

1. Identify the exact legal right, error, record event, and requested remedy.
2. Separate cognizability from timeliness, waiver, default, prior adjudication, and merits.
3. For default, identify where and how the claim could have been raised and the asserted cause.
4. For innocence, inventory all reliable evidence, including admissible government evidence and forgone charges.
5. For ineffective assistance, identify each challenged act or omission, the information then available, professional norms, and the posture-specific counterfactual.
6. Do not merge plea, appeal, trial, sentencing, and *Cronic* prejudice rules.

## Matters requiring circuit-specific work

- Relitigation of claims decided on direct appeal and exceptions for intervening law.
- Cognizability of advisory-Guidelines and other nonconstitutional sentencing errors.
- Collateral-waiver construction and recognized exceptions.
- Sentencing-innocence gateways.
- Burdens of proof, evidentiary presumptions, and remedies beyond the nationwide rules stated here.


## Authorities

- [28 U.S.C. § 2255](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-USC-28-2255.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/link/uscode/28/2255
- [Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-HILL-368-US-424.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-368/pdf/USREPORTS-368-424.pdf
- [Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-DAVIS-417-US-333.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-417/pdf/USREPORTS-417-333.pdf
- [United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-ADDONIZIO-442-US-178.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-442/pdf/USREPORTS-442-178.pdf
- [United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-FRADY-456-US-152.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-456/pdf/USREPORTS-456-152.pdf
- [Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-BOUSLEY-523-US-614.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-523/pdf/USREPORTS-523-614.pdf
- [Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-SCHLUP-513-US-298.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-513/pdf/USREPORTS-513-298.pdf
- [McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-MCQUIGGIN-569-US-383.md) · official source: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/boundvolumes/569bv.pdf
- [Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-MASSARO-538-US-500.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-538/pdf/USREPORTS-538-500.pdf
- [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-STRICKLAND-466-US-668.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-466/pdf/USREPORTS-466-668.pdf
- [United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-CRONIC-466-US-648.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-466/pdf/USREPORTS-466-648.pdf
- [Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-HILL-474-US-52.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-474/pdf/USREPORTS-474-52.pdf
- [Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357 (2017)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-LEE-582-US-357.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-582/pdf/USREPORTS-582-357.pdf
- [Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-FRYE-566-US-134.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-566/pdf/USREPORTS-566-134.pdf
- [Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-LAFLER-566-US-156.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-566/pdf/USREPORTS-566-156.pdf
- [Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-FLORES-ORTEGA-528-US-470.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-528/pdf/USREPORTS-528-470.pdf
- [Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232 (2019)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-GARZA-586-US-232.md) · official source: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/boundvolumes/586bv.pdf
- [Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001)](https://jason93.com/legal/federal-process/authorities/AUTH-SCOTUS-GLOVER-531-US-198.md) · official source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USREPORTS-531/pdf/USREPORTS-531-198.pdf